

PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NGUYEN HUU THO

Hanoi July 13, 1968

To President Nguyen Huu Tho,
Members of the South Viet Nam N.F.L., and
the Command of the South Viet Nam P.L.A.F.

CLOSELY united and fighting valiantly, the armed forces and people in Quang Tri—Thuan Thien—Hue have won a resounding victory, forcing some ten thousand most crack troops of the U.S. to flee from Khe Sanh with very serious losses. This is a heavy defeat to the U.S., and a big victory to us.

The victory at Khe Sanh has clearly shown the resourcefulness and the invincible strength of our armed forces, people and cadres. It has made a worthy contribution to the big victories of the whole of South Viet Nam since early Spring. Together with the victories on other battlefields, it has paved the way for yet bigger ones. To North Viet Nam which has just won the victory in downing 3,000 aircraft of the U.S. aggressors, the glorious Khe Sanh victory has greatly inspired the North Vietnamese armed forces and people to make greater efforts and shoot down many more pirate U.S. aircraft. Despite their defeats, the U.S. aggressors remain very obdurate. Our people, fighters and cadres, therefore, should always sharpen their vigilance, fight continuously, with vigour and success.

The South and the North are of one mind in making all-out efforts to fight the aggressor. Final victory is sure to be ours.

May I request you to convey to the people, fighters and cadres across South Viet Nam, particularly the ones at the Khe Sanh front, my warmest congratulations.

Please accept my affectionate and
"determination to win" wishes
HO CHI MINH

VIETNAM

COURIER

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P.L.A.F. assaulting Height 622 at Khe Sanh

KHE SANH BASE FELL ON JULY 9

U.S. LOSSES SINCE JANUARY 1968:

17,000 Men Put out of Action, 488 Planes and Helicopters Shot Down or Destroyed on the Ground, Over 100 Military Vehicles, 60 Cannons and Mortars, 50 Ammunition and Fuel Dumps Destroyed or Burnt, Thousands of Weapons and Hundreds of Tons of Food and War Materials Seized.

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TWO YEARS AFTER

PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH'S APPEAL

NATIONAL UNITY, KEY FACTOR OF VICTORY

WITH raids on Hanoi and Haiphong two years ago, Washington's "escalation" began to climb its highest rung. Our people had to face the most cruel aggression ever known in their history - even in universal history, in terms of the war means used by the aggressors.

President Ho Chi Minh stressed in his July 17, 1966 appeal, "Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom." In response to his call, our people took up the U.S. challenge.

United as one man, they have successfully foiled the enemy's offensives. The American imperialists have achieved no objective, neither in North nor in South Viet Nam. On the contrary, their defeat has become obvious and our victory certain.

More than 3,000 U.S. planes have been shot down over North Viet Nam—that resistance base of the whole country which Washington wanted to subdue or to "bomb back into the Stone

Age" but which has grown steadier than ever. Never before has the political and military unity of our people been more complete. With every passing day, the various strata of our people have been closing their ranks around the Party, the Government and President Ho Chi Minh to defeat the U.S. war of destruction, fulfil their duties towards their kith and kin in the South and build up socialism. Tempered in the trial, they have grown up.

Living up to their vanguard revolutionary role, our glorious working class has shown its courage and its creativeness in production and in the fighting. In spite of the enemy's savage raids, our transport and communications not only have not been halted but have even substantially increased. Industry has not only been kept going but has even made rapid progress, particularly at the province, district and village level. Let us cite one example: Quang

(Continued page 2)

The 1954 Geneva Agreements Acknowledged the Victory of the Vietnamese People's Struggle for Independence and Freedom

THE 1954 Geneva Agreements were concluded 14 years ago, about 3 months after the historic battle of Dien Bien Phu.

Putting an end to a colonial war, they victoriously crowned the long resistance waged by the entire Vietnamese people from North to South under the direction of the Government of the D.R.V.N. They granted recognition to the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Viet Nam.

At the closing session, all the participants in the 1954 Geneva Conference undertook to respect the said agreements and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of the Vietnamese people.

On behalf of the U.S. Government, General Bedell Smith declared that his country also undertook to respect the Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam as well as those on Cambodia and Laos, and to refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb the accord.

But, one day later, General Eisenhower, the then President of the U.S.A., declared that "the United States has not itself been party to, or bound by, the decisions taken by the conference [of Ge-

neva]..."

The American imperialists were determined to thoroughly sabotage the Geneva Agreements.

With a train of U.S. puppets, expeditionary troops and extremely odious crimes, for fourteen years now, systematic and overt rejection of the Geneva Agreements has always been a constant in Washington's Viet Nam policy.

A NEW LANGUAGE

BUT, its venture taking a bad, very bad turn in the South Viet Nam, Washington seems to change its tone. If, in his Baltimore speech, Mr. Johnson only made a vague reference to the Geneva Agreements: "The affirmation of old agreements," the communique issued by the White House

on Jan. 3, 1966 put it more explicitly: "The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia."

At the Paris official conversations, Mr. Averell Harriman laid emphasis on the "actual" value, so to speak, of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam right in his first speech. He has on many occasions harried back to this question, always to classify a little more the views of his Government.

The American thesis boils down to this: South Viet Nam is victim of an aggression from the North; therefore to settle the problem of the war in Viet Nam, it is necessary to revert to the "fundamental principles of the solution of 1954."

For Washington, the Accord on the cessation of

(Continued page 2)

★ RESOLUTELY MARCH FORWARD AND COMPLETELY DEFEAT THE AMERICAN WAR OF DESTRUCTION

General VAN TIEN DUNG
(See Supplement)

KHE SANH BASE FELL ON JULY 9

ON July 9, as the day was dawning, the N.F.C. flag was hoisted over the base. The flag was hoisted over the base of the Khe Sanh base, which was the strongest of U.S. forces since October 1965. The P.L.A.F. moved then to surround the last position held by U.S. Marines on Hill 1070m, 10 kilometers south-west of Ta Con.

The embarrassment of Abrams' headquarters could be seen in a series of communications, and statements. The first communication announced that on July 5, the U.S. Marines had completely evacuated Khe Sanh base whereas another communication asserted a few days later that the last Marine had left Khe Sanh on July 6. On the following day, a third communication said July 7 as the date of the complete withdrawal of the U.S. position, but the spokesman of the U.S. Command declared, AFP reported, that the operation had not ended and it had received no report of this kind. U.S. troops being still attached to the base. Everything pointed to the fact that Abrams tried to induce the public to believe that the evacuation had followed the normal course.

Facts proved that U.S. withdrawal from Khe Sanh had ended in a disaster, as shown in the following communications issued by the P.L.A.F. command of the Khe Sanh sector.

AFTER 170 days of relentless, very violent and very fierce fighting coupled with the attacks of the armed forces and people on all other battlefields throughout South Vietnam, the main forces of the P.L.A.F. at Khe Sanh have won very big successes. They have foiled the foolish and elaborate strategic plan of the U.S. aggressors on the northern Quang Tri battlefield, and forced them to accept defeat at Khe Sanh.

FOUR DRIVES OF SUSTAINED AND FIERCE ATTACKS

The glorious victory won by our armed forces and people at Khe Sanh was the outcome of a drive of sustained and fierce attacks.

1. The first drive, part of the early Spring general offensive and widespread uprisings of the Vietnamese armed forces and people, began on January 21, 1968, with the surrounding of the Hoang Hoa military sector, which was followed, on February 7, 1968, by the wiping out of the enemy's position at Lang Troi, the enemy's complex of fortified positions at Khe Sanh shook heavily under the impact of these blows. The remaining cluster of fortified positions at Ta Con, because of its isolation and was encircled on all sides.

2. The second drive was marked by the encirclement of the Ta Con cluster from February 8 to March 31, 1968, with the P.L.A.F. shattering their siege, interdicting air supply and cutting the roads

to block enemy supply by land, attacking the enemy with artillery, snubbing assaults and firing fire and intercepting enemy sorties. Nearly 10,000 U.S. Marines were tied down in their task of providing the massive support for the forces at Khe Sanh. Losses of the U.S. aggressors grew, while their morale kept sinking and their position grew increasingly desperate. In this period, the armed forces and people of Khe Sanh wiped out or heavily depleted an important part of the enemy's "crack" forces and destroyed large quantities of war means at Ta Con, attracted and pinned down the important part of the U.S. general reserves and won big victories in close coordination with other battlefields in Quang Tri—Thua Thien—Hue, Saigon—Gia Dinh and elsewhere.


3. The third drive unfolded in April when our armed forces badly trounced the enemy during its Operation Phoenix, which was meant to take pressure off the Khe Sanh. During this period, our armed forces dealt crippling blows to both the U.S. air cavalrymen and the puppet paratroopers sent in to reinforce and the beleaguered U.S. Marines.

4. The last drive began in May when our armed forces, continuing their offensive Operation Phoenix, continued to attack the enemy's forces at Khe Sanh. Sustaining heavy losses and suffering from isolation on a battlefield very disadvantageous to them and moreover finding themselves in a state of passiveness and pronounced on all the other battlefields in South Vietnam, the U.S. aggressors were forced to start the evacuation of Khe Sanh on June 30, 1968. Taking time by the tail, our armed forces immediately intercepted and attacking them from all sides, blocking the fleeing columns, cutting off their air, and launching repeated assaults on enemy positions.

On July 9, 1968, our armed forces seized Ta Con, the central position of the enemy base at Khe Sanh.

THE glorious victory won by our armed forces and people at Khe Sanh has a great multi-faceted significance:

1. They have wiped out an important part of enemy's position and destroyed large quantities of adverse war means. They have put to rest the myth of the invincibility of enemy soldiers, or nearly twice the usual number of U.S. troops stationed at Khe Sanh. These included 13,000 troops, 100 tanks and hundreds of U.S. and puppet troops captured. In terms of units, they have annihilated or badly mauled 3 U.S. battalions, one multi-battalion unit of the U.S. aggressors, their siege, interdicting air supply and cutting the roads



P.L.A.F. advice offensive against Khe Sanh

puppet companies. Our armed forces, in addition, have shot down or destroyed on the ground a large number of tanks; wrecked over 100 military vehicles including many tanks and armored cars, and over 60 big guns and mortars of large calibers, destroyed over 50 petrol and chemical storages; and captured thousands of guns, rifles, and hundreds of tons of food and military equipment.

2. Our armed forces have liberated the whole of Huong Hoi district. Over 10,000 people have broken the enemy's grip, have returned to their native villages and set up people's power there.

3. Our armed forces have launched the U.S. defenses along Highway 9, thus posing a serious threat to the whole network. The dark scheme of the U.S. aggressors to check P.L.A.F. attacks has thus been foiled.

4. The People's Liberation Armed Forces have made another stride forward in their growth and development. Applying with imagination and creativity to play a variety of fighting methods of people's war, and effecting a close coordination among various arms, they have frustrated the biggest efforts of the U.S. in its attempt to hold Khe Sanh.

5. The successes won at Khe Sanh by the armed forces and people in Northern Quang Tri are intimately associated with the brilliant victories of the general offensive and widespread uprisings of the armed forces and people all over South Vietnam in general, and those in Quang Tri—Thua Thien-Hue in particular. They are linked with the North Vietnamese armed forces and people's resounding feat of driving up to now over 3,000 aircraft of the U.S. aggressors over North Vietnam.

THREE FACETS OF ENEMY DEFEAT WITH the fall of Khe Sanh, the U.S. aggressors have sustained another heavy, all-round,

military, political, strategic and tactical defeat.

1. This defeat shows the strategic passiveness and impasse of the U.S. aggressors. In moving their troops to Khe Sanh out of passiveness, they made a big mistake. Their ambitious design to hold Khe Sanh and forced them to commit a sizeable part of their forces there, and the heavy losses suffered on this battlefield had increased their confusion caused by the U.S. aggressors' choice between troop concentration and dispersion, between static defense and mobility, and between the holding of Khe Sanh and its evacuation. Khe Sanh had been for U.S. troops a shambles which had moreover tied down tens of thousands of its mobile troops.

As a result of their Khe Sanh losses and their heavy setbacks on other battlefields in South Vietnam, the U.S. aggressors faced a more serious strategic deadlock. They were beset with more and more serious shortages of troops and war means. More serious was the fact that their general reserves were too thinly spread. Finding it impossible to hold Khe Sanh, the U.S. aggressors finally had to beat retreat to escape total destruction.

2. The loss of Khe Sanh means an ignominious failure for the U.S. aggressors in the operational level as tactical fields. It was also a setback for various U.S. arms and armed services. In a desperate attempt to hold Khe Sanh, the U.S. aggressors had, besides Marine forces, elements of the Air Cavalry, U.S. Division, U.S. and puppet paratroops. They had made the most of their fire power, using hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs, hundreds of thousands of artillery shells, and thousands of planes, including B-52 strategic bombers. They had tried a series of defensive tactics, from inter-dependent small units to big enclosures, and the form of a complex of fortified positions supported by a big mobile force with big fire power. But all these had proved useless. Their big

position defenses had only invited heavier blows, and their efforts to hold out had only brought them bitter losses. Hence, their greater confusion and impasse.

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U.S. FRENZIED AGAINST THE PEOPLE IN BOTH ZONES

AFTER taking over the command of the U.S. expeditionary forces in Vietnam, General Creighton W. Abrams threatened the Saigon, "We are going to use B-52s to drop so many bombs on them that all we need is to send in an unarmored long-range patrol team with note-books to keep score (Reuters Agency, June 30, 1968). To match his words with deeds, he sent B-52 strategic planes on savage raids on the areas located between 8 and 40 km from Saigon called "free-bombing zones" (AP, July 1 and Reuter July 2). The U.S. B-52s initiated many acts of restraint. But the exceedingly savage U.S. bombardments in the Demilitarized Zone and Vinh Linh area over the past few days have exposed their utter duplicity. Obviously, the U.S. so-called restraint is aimed at covering up the intensified bombardments on a fairly wide part of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the frantic use of B-52s, warships and heavy artillery against civilians and villages in populous areas of South Vietnam."

In fact, since July 1, 1968, B-52s have been wantonly bombing nearly all the villages in Vinh Linh area, even in the demilitarized zone: thus 2,100 tons of bombs were dropped on July 1, 2,500 tons on July 2, and about 2,500 tons on July 3. Meanwhile lots of various types raised thousands of demolition bombs on Vinh Linh, artillery from the Seventh Fleet or based south of the demilitarized zone fired tens of thousands of shells on it so much so that despite a mass of underground shelters, losses in lives and property were suffered by the people, specially by those working in the open air: Nguyen Khac was killed by B-52 as he was harvesting, Miss Nguyen Thi Ton, Tran Thi Luong and Nguyen Thi Hoi, who they were transplanting rice seedlings, Miss Tho as she was carrying rice seedlings to the field. A 3-year-old girl Nguyen Thi Tinh was also killed as she was following her mother to a cassava field.

The victims of B-52s or other U.S. weapons in Vinh Linh as well as in Saigon, Cho Lon, Gia Dinh, and those who are homeless are deprived of means of living or suffer from the loss of their property. The U.S. aggressors, impairing their belief in their own invincibility, are now using B-52s to carry out their war activities such as pressing their Thai and South Korea lackeys for

"In elaborately carrying on, and intensifying, its savage bombardments on part of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in defiance of the legitimate demands of the Vietnamese people and the world's peoples and the progressive American people, the U.S. aggressors must bear full responsibility for all consequences arising from its bloody crimes."

The big victory won at Khe Sanh by the armed forces and people of Northern Quang Tri is a brilliant victory of the line of inevitable peace and progress, and the clearheaded and talented leadership of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation of the People's Liberation Armed Forces' glorious revolutionary line of peace and progress, and the strength of the solidarity among various nationalities in our country.

USE OF B.52s AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN BOTH ZONES

THESE people (North Vietnamese—Ed.) strike me as being very tough, very hardy, very independent and very courageous. They said, and I rather believe them, that you cannot drag them to the conference table, that they can't be beaten into submission.

They would rather go back to the jungle and live in the mountains and fight a guerrilla war for 20 years against the United States as they did against the French.

Harrison E. Salisbury, President of the United States as they did against the French.

It was perfectly normal for the U.S. military to expect that, once the administration decided that it really meant to pick up the table of war against the communists in Vietnam, it would be U.S. strategic principles that would dictate the conflict.

Instead, it has been the relatively unquipped Asian adversary, often carrying all his supplies on his back, who has looted the table. The U.S. war effort—this new doctrine (that of retaliation by range, Ed.), contrary to the old doctrine of retaliation by range, Ed.), has only resulted in its own destruction.

At the loss of significant combat advantages inherent in the U.S. military organization and equipment; by loss of strategic initiative by the stronger party in this war, the U.S.; and at the escalation of the war from a relatively minor action to a major undertaking for this country. Now the tie-up in our efforts in arms that had been of limits indicates that this doctrine has been judged a failure.

Max S. Johnson, ex-commander, U.S. Ground Forces Military Institute, retired, now a military commentator of U.S. News and World Report (May 8, 1967).

U.S. News and World Report remarked in its issue of August 23, 1968: "It is clear now to military men: bombing will not win in Vietnam."

This is a dispiriting text. Why had our military leaders and long ago from themselves from the illusion of the omnipotence of air power, so cherished by civilians who think wars can be won on the cheap?

Victory through bombing—the dream of an anti-imperialist war and a painful triumph—is a cruel form of deception. Those who think the military victory the proper goal must have the moral and intellectual honesty to see, for example, Hanoi's refusal to discuss the possibility that it can come only in South Vietnam and

only through ground warfare. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Assistant to U.S. President J.F. Kennedy, in "The Executive Privilege"

When the bombing was begun in 1965, there was some hope that it would break Hanoi's will and force it to come to the negotiating table. The evidence today is that over 36 months of bombing... has only resulted in its own destruction.

With Soviet aid, the North Vietnamese have set up the most formidable air force in the world. The fact that there are so few targets in this underdeveloped country and that most targets of military significance can be easily repaired means that our plans must attack the same few targets over and over. Thus the U.S. aggressors can concentrate their anti-aircraft fire and make the flight of our bombers a costly and deadly endeavor.

At one of our discussions, I said bitterly, "The hell of it is that you fly through all that flak for a bloody crime."

U.S. commander: What are you doing there instead of getting out of South Viet Nam? U.S. pilot: But I am getting ready. Sir: Practising unwinding.

Cartoons by Le Quang Bai, Nguyen Nghiem and Le Van Hiep—From the Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army)

UP TO JULY 8 3,033 U.S. aircraft were downed in North Viet Nam

knocked down five or six times. The damned center of mass of the war, and they put them again in hours.

The political gains, stopping the bombing certainly would be pure gain. There is a

growing unwillingness among our European allies about the course we are following in South Viet Nam. Only Korea, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand are there anything resembling wholehearted support from the reactionary governments and not from the peoples at large.

Among the neutrals there is much doubt. The U.S. policy brings them (the North Vietnamese—Ed.) public sympathy throughout the world, including, as we all know, from within the United States itself.

Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, in "Foreign Affairs" (April 1968)

As to breaking their will, I have seen no evidence in any of the many intelligence reports that would lead me to believe that a less selective bombing campaign would change the resolve of the North Vietnamese leaders or deprive them of the support of the North Vietnamese people.

Robert S. McNamara, testifying before the Senate Committee on Armed Services (August 1967).

A special dish for L.B.J.'s June 23, 1968 dinner.

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VIET NAM AND THE WORLD AT LARGE

ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN D.R.V.N. AND IRAQ

ESTRUSIOUS of strengthening the friendly relations between the two countries, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the Government of the Republic of Iraq have agreed to establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level.

(Communiqué of the D.R.V.N. Foreign Ministry made public July 10)

Mongolian Delegation Pays Friendship Visit To the D.R.V.N.

At the invitation of the D.R.V.N. Government and the Viet Nam-Mongolia Friendship Association, a delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic led by Comrade J. Zhamin, member of the C.C. of the Revolutionary People's Party of Mongolia, Chairman of the State Central Committee, Chairman of the Mongolia-Viet Nam Friendship Association, Chairman of the Mongolian Committee of Support to Viet Nam, has arrived

in Hanoi for a friendship visit to the D.R.V.N. The Mongolian delegation was received by President Ho Chi Minh and Premier Phan Van Dong.

Comrade J. Zhamin has handed President Ho Chi Minh and Vietnamese Party and State leaders a letter from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the P.R. of Mongolia, I. Tsedenbal, on the 19th economic cooperation and friendly relations between the two countries.

Japanese Workers and People Staunchly Support Viet Nam's Anti-U.S. Struggle

YOKOHAMA WORKERS' ANTI-VIETNAM WAR HATS

Kobe and Yokohama are Japan's two biggest mercantile ports of Japan. Kobe belongs to the country of Hogo and has 4.5 million inhabitants, 75 per cent of them workers. The city has a long-standing tradition of revolutionary struggle. As the center of the "rice riot" in Japan at the time of the Russian revolutionary tide, it witnessed the burning of the residence of a Japanese tycoon by the masses. Since 1921 the workers' movement has been

rising quite powerfully. After World War II, the American imperialists gradually occupied Kobe and part of its harbor into a base from which to invade Viet Nam. The American imperialists have also begun to turn the Iliani airfield near Kobe into a base of aggression against Viet Nam. They have been opposed in their scheme by workers in Kobe harbour and by people of eight towns around the Iliani airfield.

We visited Kobe harbour in a motor-boat. When we passed under Bridge No. 6 handling

U.S. military goods for aggression of North Korea

loosely and of Viet Nam today, we saw many grey tanks. The workers told us that in the Korean war they had never seen American tanks and aircraft sent there for repair, as at present in the war against Viet Nam. The worker who guided us said to us, smiling, "The Vietnamese people have imposed on the U.S. In 1957, tens of thousands of workers struck for 190 hours and refused to handle American weapons for the Viet Nam war. Each year at Christmas, Yankees from the Seventh Fleet come to Kobe to spend their holiday. The workers said to one another, 'They are a source of use for the Vietnamese workers and people. We cannot let them have a good time in our port.' Then they staged a two-day demonstration and distributed leaflets in English among the G.I.s 'Leave us alone, go home!'"

Yokohama dockers received us in the meeting hall of a T. U. Organization of the harbour and presented us with a gift consisting of two worn-out workers' hats with the inscriptions "We oppose the Viet Nam aggression" and "U.S. imperialism, get out of Japan and Viet Nam" painted in red. The workers said to us, "Because of this, the harbour cannot be left without any U.S. goods which were 'used' according to their importance. For instance a lot in the Saigon region could be 'obtained' at 1,000 yen, that in Hue or

MAP OF SOUTH VIET NAM LIBERATED AREAS

PRINTERS were the first Japanese workers to take part in the movement of protest against U.S. war of aggression in Viet Nam. In an informal supper we had with workers from printing factories and T.V. and radio stations, I met Komatsu Masao. He was one of the first men constantly displaying the slogan "We oppose the aggressive war in Viet Nam", and made acquaintance with Arita Old who, despite her poor wages, was one of the first people to have made badges out of her own money and sold them in support of their holiday. The printers told us of the monopoly held by the bourgeoisie and the U.S. in the press, radio and T.V. and of the workers' demand for support to the Vietnamese people. A number of workers refused to print the words "Viet Cong" and demanded that they be properly replaced by "South Viet Nam Liberation Army" or "South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation Army." They also categorically refused to print documents speaking ill of Viet Nam. They showed us a map of South Viet Nam which had been drawn and printed by them. They drew the boundaries of South Viet Nam's localities still held by the enemy and divided their areas into left and right wings. They said which were "used" according to their importance. For instance a lot in the Saigon region could be "obtained" at 1,000 yen, that in Hue or



Members of Tokyo women's organizations wearing Vietnamese hats and collecting signatures and funds for Viet Nam.

rocking while wages are kept down. Workers draw 30,000 yen a month on an average, but a 100-yen note is valued between 7,500 and 9,000 yen monthly. Comrade Murakami, a Communist sentenced by the Japanese authorities in 1945 for his involvement on account of his opposition to the Korean war, managed to make from his 1,100-yen monthly stipend a contribution of 100,000 yen movement" funds. From jail he sent us his diary and some poems of his composition.

We have expressed our deep appreciation of the wholehearted contribution of the Japanese workers and toiling people to our struggle. Each yen collected by them is by no means an ordinary coin; it represents their sweat and their warm support for our righteous cause.

KUAN TRUONG

VIET NAM COMMITTEE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH AMERICAN PEOPLE FOUNDED

A Viet Nam Committee for Solidarity with the American People was founded in Hanoi on July 10, with Professor Hoang Minh Giam as President.

At the founding ceremony, Professor Hoang Minh Giam pointed out: "Over the past years, the American people have been ceaselessly struggling against the U.S. policy in Viet Nam, and defending their legitimate interests and traditions of freedom and democracy of the American people. The more the U.S. imperialists intensify their war of aggression against South Viet Nam and their war of destruction against the D.R.V.N., and the stronger the American people demand that their government stop bombing North Viet Nam and withdraw U.S. troops from South Viet Nam. In their struggle against U.S. aggression in Viet Nam, the Vietnamese and American

people have strengthened further their relations. Many progressive American organizations, individuals, students, youth, intellectuals, workers and religious personalities have increased contacts with the Vietnamese people. They have on many occasions sent delegates to visit Viet Nam and meet Vietnamese representatives in order to inquire about the situation and exchange views on joint actions for an end to the war in Viet Nam. They have also expressed the American people's sympathy with, and support for, the Vietnamese people."

"It is in view of the above," Professor Hoang Minh Giam said, "that the Viet Nam Committee for Solidarity with the American People has been founded with the following goals:

— To cultivate friendship between the Vietnamese and

American people through their joint actions for an end to the U.S. war in Viet Nam and the United States on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

— To promote eventual normal cultural and economic exchanges between Viet Nam and the United States on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

— To make known to the American people the history, culture and land of Viet Nam and her people in their struggle to defend independence and freedom and build up the country.

— To set up relations and exchanges of views on the situation between various organizations, individuals and cultural, artistic, scientific, religious, trade union circles, and youths, students and workers of Viet Nam and the United States with a view to increasing mutual understanding, exchanging opinions and co-ordinating actions."

The newly founded Committee issued a statement making clear its aims and conveying warm greetings to the American people.

The Committee's Vice-Presidents are Nguyen Van Kien, National Assembly member; Dang Van Mai, writer; Phan Anh, lawyer; Reverend Father Ho Thanh Bui, Bishop of Hanoi; Tran Huu Tuo, doctor; Nguyen Dinh Thi, writer; and General Cao Van Oanh, professor.

The members of its Secretariat are: Tran Huu Tuo, lawyer; Do Van Hien, secretary of the Viet Nam Union of Students; La Duy Van, journalist; and Kuan Truong, composer.

Thailand and South Korea's Criminal Moves Condemned

RECENTLY, the Thannon-Prapha reactionary clique declared that they would dispatch the "Black Panther" Division comprising 10,000 men to South Viet Nam. In early June, 1968, the Pak Jung Hi clique also announced that they would raise with 5,000 fresh troops South Korean troop strength in South Viet Nam to 55,000.

On July 4, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam issued a statement on the above envisaged moves of the Thai and South Korean authorities.

It made it clear that at a time when U.S. defeat in South Viet Nam is a foregone conclusion, "one or a few reinforcement divisions of Thailand and South Korea" surely cannot help the U.S. change the war situation."

It added, "Recently thousands of students in Bangkok have demonstrated against Thailand's participation in

the U.S. war against Viet Nam, tens of thousands of South Korean youths have refused to enlist and see service in South Viet Nam. This once again proves that in the supreme interests of their Fatherland and for the friendship with the Vietnamese people, the Thai and Korean people will certainly step up their struggle, and will decidedly not allow the Thannon-Prapha clique to throw impunity Thai and South Korean youths into the South Viet Nam battlefield to serve as cannon-fodder for the U.S. aggressors."

TO THE READER

We are aware that there is much room for improvement in the working of the newspaper. We are sure that you will help us to improve it by sending us your suggestions and criticisms.

The 1954 Geneva Agreements...

(Continued from page 1)

hostilities in Viet Nam seemed to be the document of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

ONE OF A BLUFF elements of the American thesis, which was laid out in the 1954 Geneva Conference, was that there is only one Viet Nam.

It is the Viet Nam that has always been one throughout its history. The Viet Nam dates back several thousand years. It is the Viet Nam that waged a dogged resistance against colonialism for nearly a century which ended successfully with the August Revolution of 1945. It is the Viet Nam that, 9 years later, with Dien Bien Phu.

It is the Viet Nam of the Geneva Agreements which recognize her unity and independence. It is the Viet Nam that was re-united by July 1956: the military demarcation line as defined in a provisional line which could in no way be interpreted as territorial or political boundary.

Washington has clung to this falsification of history and the Geneva Agreements with the essential design to induce peace in Viet Nam. The war of aggression which is still raging on in South Viet Nam comes from North

alone, the U.S. imperialists aim at a double goal: to divert the attention of public opinion from the true origin of the war which is, let us say it again, aggression by the U.S. against Viet Nam from the other side of the Pacific while striving to maintain the partition of Viet Nam.

The U.S. has not respected at all the independence and sovereignty of Viet Nam. It is waging at present on the Vietnamese people in the most serious infringement of their country's independence and sovereignty. Washington, however, publicly maintains the opposite.

The U.S. has been impudently turning its troops against South Viet Nam and its planes and warships against North Viet Nam, whereas Vietnamese people have never trespassed on its territory.

Today it even has the cheek to set conditions for everything; for the cessation of its air and naval attacks on the North, for the withdrawal of its troops and planes from the South Viet Nam. It has even gone so far as to demand that the puppet government proposed

up by American bayonets and dollars on the Vietnamese people in the South. How can it convince people that it "respects" the independence and sovereignty of Viet Nam and her people's self-determination?

Never! The U.S. imperialists are trampling underfoot the national rights of the Vietnamese people and, in spite of their successive defeats, still persist in their aggressive war in Viet Nam.

Facts over the 24 years of the existence of the Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam have prompted the U.S. government to make the U.S. has rejected these agreements to sabotage them; it favors the "solution of the situation" to sabotage them better.

VIET NAM'S CLEAR-CUT POSITION

BETTER than anybody else, Washington knows the attitude of the Viet Nam people.

As the U.S. has pretended military action, our Southern compatriots have been giving a due reception to the G.I.s, the marines and their mates and dealing them out as they deserve. The people and the armed forces of the D.R.V.N. have shown no favoritism to the U.S. planes. It has had to agree to the official withdrawal of the Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam.

In the current talks with the D.R.V.N. there has been no sign that the U.S. is moving "farther and faster" as Mr. Johnson has asserted. Evidently, Washington is responsible for the obstacles to their program. It must face this fact: neither violence nor falsification can help the U.S. scrap the Geneva Agreements. The U.S. and the Vietnamese people are going from one step to another. The people who sow the wind will reap the whirlwind; that is the law of nature. The American leaders on the occasion of the 14th anniversary of the Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam.

Military Operations

*** Ta Con Seized by P.L.A.F. — The Whole of Khe Sanh Liberated — U.S. Losses Between June 26 and July 9: 1,700 G.I.s Put out of Action, 35 Planes and Choppers Shot Down or Destroyed.**

*** 750 Enemy Troops Killed, Wounded or Taken Prisoner in 9 Days in Other Areas of Quang Tri Province.**

*** 200 Military Vehicles and 36 Copters Destroyed or Damaged, a Regiment's and a Battalion's Commanding Units and 2 Companies of Puppet Division 1 Destroyed Near Hue.**

AS announced in the communiqués of the Khe Sanh Front Command published in page 4, the whole of this sector was liberated early on July 9 when the P.L.A.F. hoisted their flag on Ta Con, the key position of the U.S. entrenched camp. Then, from June 26 (when U.S. troops began their retreat) to July 9, the Americans lost nearly 1,700 men killed or wounded in this sector.

Between July 3 and 9, 1,000 U.S. Marines were put out of action, and 22 aircraft destroyed on the ground or shot down. Tough fighting took place on the night of July 3 at Hills 832, 845 and 869 where 150 G.I.s were killed or wounded and two helicopters cut down by P.L.A.F. automatic arms fire.

In an ambush on July 3, 23 vehicles of an enemy convoy withdrawing from Ta Con were destroyed on Highway No. 9. On the afternoon of July 4 alone, the U.S. lost over this sector 10 jets — 6 F4 Phantom fighter-bombers and A4 Skyhawks.

The combats at hills 845, 832, 689 and 639 on

July 5 and 6 cost the enemy 2 companies wiped out and 5 helicopters and a Phantom fighter-bomber shot down.

On July 7, which the enemy forces in several positions were assembling for evacuation by helicopters, Liberation gunners pounded Hills 604, 625, 832 and 871. Then Liberation infantrymen charged, and engaged the enemy troops in fierce hand-to-hand fighting, and later in the day completely liberated Hills 845, 832, 532 and 471, brought down 3 planes and seized 2 choppers in great shape.

Giving no breathing space to the enemy in complete disarray, the P.L.A.F. pressed on their attacks against the remaining enemy positions on July 8 and 9, turning the Marine retreat into a great debacle.

FURTHER East, in the Dong Ha — Con Tien sector, the enemy lost 500 men put out of action and to armored cars destroyed between June 27 and July 3. In An Hoa, south of Quang Tri provincial capital, on June 27, the P.L.A.F. killed, wounded or captured

250 enemy soldiers, destroyed 9 armored cars and shot down 2 helicopters.

IN Hue sector, the commanding unit of 3rd Regiment, puppet Division 1, and that of 2nd Battalion, same division, and two companies were destroyed on July 2 at Hill 416, 27km west of Hue.

Giai Phong Press Agency also reported that on June 18, Camp Evans, base of the U.S. First Air Cavalry situated at Dong Lam (21km northwest of Hue), came under another shelling and suffered heavy losses: 200 vehicles and 36 helicopters destroyed or damaged.

NEAR Saigon, elements of U.S. 9th Infantry Division were intercepted on July 3 during violent engagements southwest of the city. In this action, the P.L.A.F. shot down a helicopter transporting high-ranking U.S. officers, killing several of them including a lieutenant-colonel (identified as Van Dusen, brother-in-law of General Westmoreland, former commander of U.S. forces in South Viet Nam.)

FROM Nam's black beard people would think he was about sixty. But his shining eyes under bushy brows make him look fifty. Quite right. Recently when he fought an American chopper, he was exactly fifty.

It was a cloudless morning. A chopper rattled in from Quang Tri town, along Highway No. 9. Nam was working with his co-villagers in a field nearby. The plane's noise got on his nerves as these last few months he had been such flights over villages near enemy's encampment to kidnap suspects. Nam's guerrilla team was preparing to inflict punishment on the gangsters.

Nam's regret the hand-grenade did not explode. As he was about to be caught by the Yankee who had jumped to his feet from under the plane, he sprang up and ran at full speed in the direction of the village, with other G.I.s on his heels firing frantic shots. Then he tripped and tumbled on a clod. He was dragged along and flung into the helicopter which immediately rounded up. Nam stole a look at the Yankees but did not understand what they were saying to one another about him. A fellow sitting opposite him said in Vietnamese with a broad Yankee accent: "You, Vietnam, are

An "Old" Guerilla on Highway No 9

That morning, before going to the field, on order from the chief guerrilla, he had brought along a hand-grenade which he carried hidden in his belt for self-defence. The chopper spotted him and swooped down like a vulture falling on its prey. He heard from an electric megaphone an exhortation in imperfect Vietnamese: "Vietcong, surrender!"

The crowd dispersed in a stampede. Only Nam did not move. The chopper hovered in the air. Its rotor-blade nearly lifted the "old" guerrilla up and was about to blow his cloth to shreds with the whirlwind it stirred up. It landed at twenty metres from him. Yankees swarmed out. Nam whipped out his hand-grenade, removed its safety pin, hurled it and crouched on the ground. The Yankees scrambled back to the helicopter. One of them slipped under the craft for cover.

A dead silence. Much to

so daring. You'll be put to death."

Through the plane's half open door, Nam saw Highway No. 9 winding beneath like a big grey snake. He watched at a Yankee standing nearby to gauge the distance between them. All of a sudden, as moved by a supernatural power, he sprang to his feet and kicked the enemy in the chest. As the G.I. fell with his arms spread out, the guerrilla caught his M-16 gun and pulled the trigger. Bullets rained on the G.I.s in the cockpit. Two of them fell on him. He wriggled out of their grasp, clasped another coming his way and both tumbled out just when the cockpit caught fire. The chopper staggered and crashed on a ricefield. A thick black cloud of smoke rose up.

When the guerrillas and villagers ran to the spot they found Nam unconscious on top of a Yankee, his hands squeezing hard his adversary's neck.

H. T.

ENEMY LOSSES IN JUNE

- 55,750 men put out of action, including 16,400 G.I.s and satellite troops.
- 13 battalions, one armored squadron and 33 companies wiped out or decimated.
- 275 planes and helicopters downed or destroyed, 350 military vehicles including 350 tanks and armored cars, destroyed or damaged, 61 vessels burnt or sunk.
- 80 artillery pieces, 30 ammunition and fuel depots, and 20 bridges destroyed or set afire.
- 50 military posts flattened.

IN THE SAIGON AREA ALONE

- 17,500 enemy troops (including 7,500 G.I.s) put out of action.
- 40 aircraft downed or destroyed, 200 military vehicles destroyed or damaged, 25 vessels burnt or sunk.



G.I.s captured by the P.L.A.F.